

# Sharing the World with Digital Minds<sup>1</sup>

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Carl Shulman<sup>†</sup> & Nick Bostrom<sup>†</sup>

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## Abstract

The minds of biological creatures occupy a small corner of a much larger space of possible minds that could be created once we master the technology of artificial intelligence. Yet many of our moral intuitions and practices are based on assumptions about human nature that need not hold for digital minds. This points to the need for moral reflection as we approach the era of advanced machine intelligence. Here we focus on one set of issues, which arise from the prospect of digital minds with superhumanly strong claims to resources and influence. These could arise from the vast collective benefits that mass-produced digital minds could derive from relatively small amounts of resources. Alternatively, they could arise from individual digital minds with superhuman moral status or ability to benefit from resources. Such beings could contribute immense value to the world, and failing to respect their interests could produce a moral catastrophe, while a naive way of respecting them could be disastrous for humanity. A sensible approach requires reforms of our moral norms and institutions along with advance planning regarding what kinds of digital minds we bring into existence.

## 1. Introduction

Human biological nature imposes many practical limits on what can be done to promote somebody's welfare. We can only live so long, feel so much joy, have so many children, and benefit so much from additional support and resources. Meanwhile, we require, in order to flourish, that a complex set of physical, psychological, and social conditions be met.

However, these constraints may loosen for other beings. Consider the possibility of machine minds with conscious experiences, desires, and capacity for reasoning and autonomous decision-making.<sup>2</sup> Such machines could enjoy moral status, i.e. rather than being mere tools of humans they and their interests could matter in their own right. They need neither be subject to the same practical limitations in their ability to benefit from additional resources nor depend on the same complex requirements for their survival and flourishing. This could be a wonderful development: lives free of

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<sup>†</sup> Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford.

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<sup>2</sup> We assume that appropriately architected AI could be conscious, though it's worth noting that some accounts of moral status do not view this as a necessary condition for having moral status; see e.g. (Chalmers, 2010) for a discussion of AI consciousness, and (Kagan, 2019) for a discussion of moral status in unconscious but agential AI.

pain and disease, bubbling over with happiness, enriched with superhuman awareness and understanding and all manner of higher goods.<sup>3</sup>

Recent progress in machine learning raises the prospect that such digital minds may become a practical reality in the foreseeable future (or possibly, to a very limited extent, might already exist). Some of these minds could realize Robert Nozick's (1974, p. 41) famous philosophical thought experiment of "utility monsters":

Utilitarian theory is embarrassed by the possibility of utility monsters who get enormously greater sums of utility from any sacrifice of others than these others lose. For, unacceptably, the theory seems to require that we all be sacrificed in the monster's maw, in order to increase total utility.

Derek Parfit (1984, p. 343) argues that while it is difficult to imagine a life millions of times as much worth living as the best-off humans, similar results can be obtained by considering the quantitative dimension of *population size*, in which there is clearly no conceptual barrier to extreme values.

We will argue that population size is only one of several quantitative dimensions—together with several less certain qualitative dimensions—along which digital minds may vastly excel humans in the benefit they derive per unit of resource consumption. These multiple paths make the conclusion that at least one will be actualized more robust.

While non-utilitarians may fancy themselves immune to the utility monster challenge, most reasonable views are in fact susceptible, to various degrees. This is because even if we postulate that no deontological violations would occur, human interests may still be adversely affected by the advent of utility monsters, since the latter could have stronger moral claims to state aid or natural resources and other scarce resources, thus reducing the amount that could be defensibly claimed by human beings. Digital minds with these properties could make the world more morally valuable from an impartial point of view while also making common norms much more demanding for existing beings (or indeed any less optimized minds (digital or otherwise)).

## **2. Paths to realizing super-beneficiaries**

While the term "utility monster" has academic history, it is a pejorative and potentially offensive way of referring to beings that have unusually great needs or are able to realize extraordinarily good lives. We will therefore instead adopt the following nomenclature:

*super-beneficiary*: a being that is superhumanly efficient at deriving well-being from resources

*super-patient*<sup>4</sup>: a being with superhuman moral status

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<sup>3</sup> Some of these could be at least partially available to enhanced or uploaded human beings; (Bostrom, 2008a, 2008b; Chalmers, 2010).

<sup>4</sup> We thank Daniel Dewey for suggesting this term.

The term “utility monster” is ambiguous but may most closely correspond to “super-beneficiary”. Some views hold that moral status enters into a calculation of moral claims in a different way than strength of interests, e.g. as an overall multiplier or by giving rise to a distinct set of duties or deontological constraints. Shelly Kagan (2019), for instance, argues that the moral weight of a given interest—such as the interest in avoiding a certain amount of suffering—should be weighted by the degree of moral status of the subject that has the interest, with the degree of status depending on various psychological attributes and potentials. If a being has interests that should be given much greater moral consideration than the interests of a human being, not because the interest is stronger but because it has higher moral status, then that being would be a super-patient in our terminology.

The possibility of super-patient status is controversial: some claim that humans hold a “full moral status” that cannot be exceeded, while others (such as Kagan) argue that super-patient status is possible since the psychological capacities taken to confer human moral status admit to superhuman degrees. In this paper we will mainly explore paths to super-beneficiary status, which may combine with the less controversial assumption that digital minds could have moral status at least equal to human beings to yield extreme moral claims.

## **2.1. Reproductive capacity**

One of the most basic features of computer software is the ease and speed of exact reproduction, provided computer hardware is available. Hardware can be rapidly constructed so long as its economic output can pay for manufacturing costs (which have historically fallen, on price-performance bases, by enormous amounts; Nordhaus, 2007). This opens up the door for population dynamics that would take multiple centuries to play out among humans to be compressed into a fraction of a human lifetime. Even if *initially* only a few digital minds of a certain intellectual capacity can be affordably built, the number of such minds could soon grow exponentially or super-exponentially, until limited by other constraints. Such explosive reproductive potential could allow digital minds to vastly outnumber humans in a relatively short time—correspondingly increasing the collective strength of their claims.

Furthermore, if the production of digital minds and required hardware proceeds until the wages of the resulting minds equal marginal costs, this could drive wages downward towards machine subsistence levels as natural resources become a limiting factor. These may be insufficient for humans (and obsolete digital minds) to survive on (Hanson, 2001; Aghion, Jones and Jones, 2017). Such circumstances make redistributive issues more pressing—a matter of life and death—while the Malthusian population growth would make claims to transfer payments effectively insatiable.

Another important aspect of fast and cheap reproduction is that it permits rapid turnover of population. A digital mind that is deleted can be immediately replaced by a copy of a fully-fledged mind of the newest edition—in contrast to the human case,

where it takes nine months to produce a drooling baby.<sup>5</sup> Economic pressures could thus push towards very frequent erasure of “obsolete” minds and replacement with minds that generate more economic value with the same hardware.

A plausible continuation of current software practices applied to digital minds could thus involve extremely large numbers of short lives and deaths, even as a fraction of the number of minds in existence at any given time. Such ephemeral digital minds may be psychologically mature, chronologically young, with long *potential* lifespans yet very short default life expectancies in the absence of subsidy. If we think that dying young while being able to live long is a large deprivation, or is very unfair when others are able to live out long lives, then this could ground an especially strong claim for these digital minds to resources to extend their lifespan (or other forms of compensation). If death in itself is a bad (and not merely an opportunity cost of foregone life), then this rapid turnover of minds could also increase the extent of this disvalue per life-year lived.

## **2.2. Cost of living**

It is plausible that many digital minds will need less income to sustain themselves at a given standard of living. The cost of computer hardware to support digital minds will likely decline well below the cost of supporting a human brain and body. If we look beyond mere subsistence, physical goods and services suitable for human consumption (such as housing and transportation) tend to be more expensive than information technology and virtual goods to meet the equivalent needs of a digital mind. Nor need a digital mind suffer from inclement environmental conditions, pollution, disease, biological aging, or any number of other impositions that depress human well-being.

The cost of producing a given number of (quality-adjusted) life years for a humanlike digital mind will therefore likely fall far below the equivalent cost for a biological human. Large differentials in cost of living mean that, when questions of distribution arise, a resource that confers a small benefit to a human may confer large benefits to many digital minds. If the energy budget required to sustain one human life for one month can sustain ten digital minds for one year, that would ground a powerful argument for favoring the latter in a situation of scarcity.

## **2.3. Subjective speed**

Hardware with higher serial speeds can be used to run digital minds faster. Current computer clock speeds are measured in gigahertz, millions of times greater than firing rates of human neurons; and signal transmission speeds can similarly exceed the conductance speed of human nerves. It is therefore likely that digital minds with humanlike capabilities could think at least thousands of times (and perhaps millions) faster than humans do, given a sufficient supply of hardware. If a digital mind packs thousands of subjective years of life into a single calendar year, then it seems the former (“subjective time”, not wall-clock time) is the correct measure for such things as the amount of well-being gained from extended life (Bostrom and Yudkowsky, 2014).

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<sup>5</sup> It may be unclear, however, whether an exact or almost exact copy of an existing mind would constitute a new distinct person or instead an additional instantiation of the person whose mind served as the template.

Since speedup requires paying for more hardware, this provides a way for individual digital minds to get much higher (subjective-life-years per dollar) returns from wealth than humans usually can. At low speeds, the gains available to digital minds would be close to linear; though as speeds approach the limits of technology, marginal costs of further speed increments would rise.<sup>6</sup>

Because these gains of running faster can accrue to then-existing initially slower-running individuals, this effect is especially relevant to population axiologies that take a “person-affecting” approach (more on this later).

#### **2.4. Hedonic skew**

There is reason to think that engineered minds could enjoy much greater durations and intensity of pleasure. Human psychology has evolved to generate pleasure and pain where this motivated behaviors associated with reproductive fitness in past generations, not to maximize well-being. This entails for us a great deal of hard-to-avoid suffering. Our enjoyments, meanwhile, are doled out only sparingly. Culinary pleasures are regulated by hunger, sexual ones by libido. Pleasure drawn from relative status or power over others is structurally scarce. Most rewards are also moderated by mechanisms such as boredom and tolerance, which progressively reduce the delight obtained from repeated stimuli or continual benign conditions. For digital minds, these restrictions could be loosened to allow sustainable intense pleasures alongside liberation from the painful parts of present human existence.

The hedonic balance for humans, too, would be amenable to great improvement with the kind of advanced technology that would likely either precede or closely follow mature machine intelligence technology.<sup>7</sup> However, radically adjusting the hedonic balance for biological humans may be more “costly” than doing the same for *de novo* digital minds, in a couple of ways: (a) interventions that require brain surgery, extensive pharmacological fine-tunings and manipulations, or the equivalent, may, at least in the nearer term, be infeasible or expensive; and (b) more radical transformations of our psyches would risk destroying personal-identity or other properties of our current human nature that we value.<sup>8</sup> The mind-designs of sentient machines could thus have great advantages in terms of the efficiency with which they can realize hedonically valuable states.

#### **2.5. Hedonic range**

In addition to changing the fraction of time spent inhabiting different parts of the hedonic scale accessible to present human beings, it might also be possible—more speculatively—to design digital minds that could realize “off the charts” states of hedonic well-being—levels of bliss that human brains are totally incapable of instantiating.

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<sup>6</sup> Hanson (2016, pp. 63-65) argues that cost-increases with speedup would be initially near-linear, i.e. 2x speedup requiring close to 2x hardware budget, up to substantially superhuman speeds.

<sup>7</sup> David Pearce (1995) has argued that biological minds could be engineered to run on “gradients of bliss” rather than the full current pain-pleasure span.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. (Agar, 2010, pp. 164-189).

Evolutionary considerations give some support for this hypothesis. Insofar as intensity of pleasures and pains correspond to strength of behavioral responses, evolution should tend to adjust hedonic experiences to yield approximately fitness-maximizing degrees of effort to attain or avoid them. But for human beings, it is generally much easier to *lose* large amounts of reproductive fitness in a short time than to *gain* an equivalent amount. Staying in a fire for a few moments can result in permanent injury or death, at the cost of all of an organism's remaining reproductive opportunities. No single meal or sex act has as much at stake per second—it takes weeks to starve, and the expected number of reproducing children produced per minute of mating is small. Thus, evolution may have had call to generate more intensely motivating-per-second pains in response to injury than pleasures in response to positive events. Engineered minds, by contrast, could be crafted to experience pleasures as intensely rewarding as the worst torments are disrewarding. Bliss or misery more completely outside of the human experience might also be possible.<sup>9</sup>

## 2.6. Inexpensive preferences

For hedonistic accounts of well-being, we noted the possibility of making super-beneficiaries by designing digital minds either to find more things pleasurable or to have superhumanly intense pleasures. For preference-satisfactionist accounts of well-being, a parallel pair of possibilities arise: making digital minds that have preferences that are very easy to satisfy, or making digital minds that have superhumanly strong preferences. We defer discussion of the latter possibility to the next subsection. Here we discuss minds with easily satisfied preferences.

The basic case is pretty straightforward—more so than the parallel case regarding pleasurable experiences, since the attribution of preferences does not require controversial assumptions about machine consciousness. If we understand preferences in a functionalist fashion, as abstract entities involved in convenient explanations of (aspects of) the behavior of intelligent goal-directed processes (along with beliefs), then it is clear that digital minds could have preferences. Moreover, they could be designed to have preferences that are trivially easy to satisfy: for example, a preference that there exist at least fourteen stars, or that a particular red button is pressed at least once.

Some preference-satisfactionist accounts impose additional requirements on which preferences can count towards somebody's well-being. Sadistic or malevolent preferences are often excluded, for example. Some philosophers also exclude preferences that are "unreasonable", such as the preference of someone who is obsessively committed to counting all the blades of grass on the lawns of Princeton.<sup>10</sup> Depending on how restrictive one is about which preferences count as "reasonable", this may or may not be an easy bar to clear.

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<sup>9</sup> One might think that a hedonic state that fully captures the attention of a mind and overrides all other concerns would constitute an in-principle maximum of hedonic intensity. However, it seems plausible that a larger mind that is "more conscious" could in the relevant sense contain "a greater amount" of maximally-intense hedonic experience.

<sup>10</sup> As does Parfit (1984, p. 498), citing Rawls (1971, p. 432), who drew from Stace (1944).

Some other types of requirement that may be imposed are that well-being-contributing preferences must be subjectively *endorsed* (perhaps by being accompanied by a second-order preference to have the first-order preference) or *grounded* in additional psychological or behavioral attributes—such as dispositions to smile, feel stressed, experience joy, becoming subdued, having one’s attention focused, and so on. These requirements could probably be met by a digital mind. Humans have preferences for sensory pleasures, love, knowledge, social connection, and achievement, the satisfaction of which are commonly held to contribute to well-being. Since close analogues to these could be easily instantiated in virtual reality, along with whatever psychological or behavioral attributes and second-order endorsements that may be necessary, these requirements are unlikely to prevent the creation of beings with strong yet qualifying preferences that are very easily satisfied.

## **2.7. Preference strength**

While creating extremely easy-to-satisfy preferences is conceptually simple, creating preferences with superhuman “strength” is more problematic. In the standard von Neumann-Morgenstern construction, utility functions are unique only up to affine transformations: adding to or multiplying a utility function by a constant does not affect choices, and the strength of a preference is defined only in relation to other preferences of the same agent. Thus, to make interpersonal comparisons, some additional structure has to be provided to normalize different utility functions and bring them onto a common scale.<sup>11</sup>

There are various approaches that attempt to give “equal say” to the preferences of different agents based solely on preference structure, equalizing the expected influence of different agents and mostly precluding preference-strength super-beneficiaries.<sup>12</sup> Such approaches, however, leave out some important considerations. First, they do not take into account psychological complexity or competencies: some minimal system, such as a digital thermostat, may get the same weight as psychologically complex minds. Second, they deny any role of emotional gloss or other features we intuitively use to assess desire strength in ourselves and other humans. And third, the resulting social welfare function can fail to provide a mutually acceptable basis of cooperation for disinterested parties, as it gives powerful agents with strong alternatives the same weight as those without power and alternatives.

The first two issues might require an investigation of these psychological strength-weighting features. The third might be addressed with a contractarian stance that assigns weights based on game-theoretic considerations and (hypothetical) bargaining. The contractarian approach would not be dominated by super-beneficiaries out of proportion to their bargaining power, but it approaches perilously close to “might makes right”, and it fails to provide guidance to those contracting parties who care about the vulnerable and wish to allocate aid irrespective of the recipient’s bargaining power.

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<sup>11</sup> Harsanyi (1953) showed that a weighted sum of utility functions is optimal under certain assumptions, but the theorem leaves the values of the weights undetermined.

<sup>12</sup> E.g. (MacAskill, Cotton-Barratt and Ord, 2020)

## 2.8. Objective list goods and flourishing

Objective list theories of well-being claim that how well somebody's life is going for them depends on the degree to which their life contains various distinct kinds of goods (which may include pleasure and preference-satisfaction *inter alia*). Some commonly appearing items are knowledge, achievement, friendship, moral virtue, and aesthetic appreciation, though there is much variation in the identification and weighting of different goods. What these theories have in common is that they include items whose contribution to well-being is not wholly determined by a subject's attitudes, feelings, and beliefs but require also that some external standard of success be met.

Many items found in objective lists are open to extreme instantiations. For example, superintelligent machines could cultivate intellectual virtues beyond the human range. Moral virtues, too, could reach superhuman levels: a digital mind could begin life with extensive moral knowledge and perfect motivation always to do what's morally right, so that they remain impeccably sinless, whereas every adult human winds up with a foul record of infractions.

Friendship is a complex good, but perhaps it might be boiled down to its basic constituents, such as loyalty, mutual understanding of each other's personalities and interests, and past interaction history. These constituents could then be reassembled in a maximally efficient form, so that digital minds could perhaps sustain a greater number of deeper friendships over far longer periods than is possible for humans.

Or consider achievement. According to Hurka and Tasioulas's (2006) account of achievement, its value reflects the degree to which it results from the exercise of practical reason: the best achievements being those where challenging goals are met via hierarchical plans that subdivide into ever-more intricate sub-plans. We can then easily conceive of digital "super-achievers" that relentlessly pursue ever-more elaborate projects without being constrained by flagging motivation or drifting attention.

In these and many other ways, digital minds could realize a variety of objective goods to a far greater extent than is possible for us humans.

Another view of well-being is that it consists in "flourishing", which might be cashed out in terms of exercising our characteristic capacities or in terms of achieving our "telos". On an Aristotelian conception, for example, a being flourishes to the degree to which it succeeds at realizing its telos or essential nature. This kind of flourishing would seem to be available to a digital mind, which certainly could exercise characteristic capacities, and which might also be ascribed a telos in whatever sense human beings have one—either one defined by the intentions of a creator, or one that derives from the evolutionary or other dynamics that brought it into being and shaped its nature. So it should be possible to at least equal, and probably go somewhat beyond humans in terms of achieving such flourishing; though how we would understand radically superhuman flourishing, on this kind of account, is less clear.

## 2.9. Mind scale



At an abstract level, we can consider a range of possible mind-scales, from tiny insect-like (or even thermostat-like) minds up to vast superintelligent minds with computational throughput greater than today's entire human population. The cost of construction increases as we go up this scale, as does moral significance. An important question is what the relative rate of increase is of these two variables.

Consider first the hypothesis that welfare grows more slowly than cost. This would suggest that the greatest total welfare would be obtained by building vast numbers of tiny minds. If this were true, insect populations may already overwhelmingly exceed the human population in aggregate capacity for welfare; and enormous populations of minimally qualifying digital minds would take precedence over both insects and beings of human or superhuman scale.

Consider instead the hypothesis that welfare grows faster than cost. This would suggest the opposite conclusion: that the greatest total welfare would be obtained by concentrating resources in a few giant minds.

The case where minds on the scale of human minds are optimal seems to represent a very special case, where some critical threshold exists near our level or where the scaling relationship has a kink just around the human scale point. Such a coincidence may seem somewhat unlikely from an impartial point of view, though it might emerge more naturally in accounts that anchor the concept of well-being in human experience or human nature.

We can ask more specifically with respect to particular attributes, whether a kink or threshold at the human level is plausible. For example, we can ask this question about the amount of awareness that a brain instantiates. It is at least not obvious why it should be the case that the maximally efficient way of turning resources into awareness would be by constructing minds of human size, although one would have to examine specific theories of consciousness to further investigate this issue.<sup>13</sup> Similarly, one might ask with regard to moral status how it varies with mind size. Again, the claim that human-sized minds are optimal in this respect may seem a little suspicious, absent further justification.

Even if human brain size *were* optimal for generating awareness or moral status, it still wouldn't follow that human brain *structure* is so. Large parts of our brains seem irrelevant or only weakly relevant for the amount of awareness or the degree of moral status we possess. For instance, much cortical tissue is dedicated to processing high-resolution visual information; yet people with blurry vision and even persons who are totally blind appear to be capable of being just as aware and having just as high moral status as those with eagle-eyed visual acuity.

It therefore seems quite plausible that super-beneficiary status is possible by engineering minds at different sizes, both on grounds that the scaling relationship between resources and value is unlikely to have a peak at human mind-size, and also

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<sup>13</sup> This issue is especially acute since many theories of consciousness specified enough to consider computational implementations appear susceptible to extremely minimal implementations (Herzog, Esfeld and Gerstner, 2007).

because substantial tracts of the human mind have low relevance to degree of awareness, moral status, or other attributes that most directly relate to the amount of well-being or the amount of moral-status-weighted well-being that is generated.

### 3. Moral and political implications of digital super-beneficiaries

Let us summarize the dimensions along which digital minds could attain welfare with superhuman resource-efficiency:

SOME PATHS TO SUPERHUMAN WELFARE
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>● reproductive capacity</li><li>● cost of living</li><li>● subjective speed</li><li>● hedonic skew</li><li>● hedonic range</li><li>● inexpensive preferences</li><li>● preference strength</li><li>● objective list goods and flourishing</li><li>● mind scale</li></ul>

Some of these dimensions are relevant only to particular accounts of well-being. The possibility of extreme preference strength, for instance, is directly relevant to preference-based accounts but not to hedonistic ones. Others, such as cost of living, are more generally relevant and would seem to apply to almost any view that accords digital minds moral status and that takes into account costs when making decisions in conditions of scarcity. The dimensions also vary somewhat in the magnitudes of increased well-being they could enable, and how easily and inexpensively such extreme values could be attained. Taken collectively, however, they make a fairly robust case that super-beneficiaries would indeed become feasible at technological maturity. In other words, it will be the case, according to a wide range of popular theories of well-being, that vastly greater welfare per unit of resources can be generated by investing those resources in digital minds rather than biological humans.

Two important questions therefore arise (which we can ask separately of different moral theories):

- How should we view the prospect of being able to create super-beneficiaries in the future?
- How should we respond if we were presented with a *fait accompli*, in which super-beneficiaries, perhaps in great numbers, have come into existence?

#### 3.1. Creating super-beneficiaries

Many views that see the creation of good new lives as an important value would regard the prospect of populating the future with super-beneficiaries as immensely attractive, and a failure to take advantage of this opportunity as something that would drastically curtail the value of the future—an existential catastrophe (Bostrom, 2013).

On the other hand, one could also argue that we have reason *not* to create super-beneficiaries precisely on grounds that once such beings exist, they would have a dominant claim to scarce resources, whence we would be obliged to transfer (potentially all) resources away from humans to these super-beneficiaries, to the detriment of humanity. Nicholas Agar (2010) has presented an argument along these lines as giving us (at least human-relative) moral reason to oppose the creation of “posthumans” with some combination of greater moral status, power, and potential for well-being.

To justify such a denial of the moral desirability of creating super-beneficiaries, one might invoke a “person-affecting” principle in line with Narveson’s (1973) slogan, “morality is about making people happy, not making happy people.”<sup>14</sup> If our duties are only to existing people, and we have no moral reason to create additional new people, then in particular we would not have any duty to create super-beneficiaries; and if creating such super-beneficiaries would harm existing people, we would have a duty not to create them. Presumably, we would *not* have a duty to avoid creating super-beneficiaries if the humans who would thereby be harmed belong to some future generation, such that “butterfly effects” of our choice would change which humans come into existence; but at least we would not be under any positive duty to create super-beneficiaries on such a view.

A strict person-affecting approach, however, has some rather counterintuitive consequences. It would imply, for example, that we have no moral reason to take any actions now in order to mitigate the impact of climate change on future generations; and that if the actions imposed a cost on the present generation, we may have a moral reason *not* to take them. Because it has such implications, most would reject a strict person-affecting ethic. Weaker or more qualified versions may have wider appeal. One might, for example, give *some* extra weight but not strict dominance to benefiting existing people.

A similar result, where we have *some* moral reason to create super-beneficiaries even though existing humans are accorded special consideration, may emerge from taking into account moral uncertainty about population ethics (Greaves and Ord, 2017). Depending on how such uncertainty is handled, one might *either* get the conclusion that the most “choice-worthy” course of action is to spend all resources on creating super-beneficiaries, even if one thinks that it is unlikely that this would in fact be the best use of resources; *or* (more plausibly in our view) that the most choice-worthy course of action is to set aside at least some resources for the benefit of existing humans even if one thinks it likely that it would in fact be better to use all the resources to create super-beneficiaries.

Another approach is represented by asymmetric person-affecting views that allow for moral concern about causing the existence of net *bad* lives—lives not worth living (Frick, 2014). Such views would hold that we have strong reasons to avoid the creation of digital minds with enormous negative welfare and that we ought to be willing to accept large costs to the existing human population to avoid such outcomes. Other versions of asymmetric views, while denying that we have moral

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<sup>14</sup> Frick (2014) offers a recent attempt in line with the slogan.

reasons to fill the future with new beings to experience as much positive utility as possible, maintain that we nevertheless have a moral obligation to ensure that the net utility of the future is above the zero-line. Such views may consequently attach great importance to creating enough positive super-beneficiaries to “offset” the disutility of future beings (Thomas, 2019).

### **3.2. Sharing the world with super-beneficiaries**

If we consider the case where super-beneficiaries have already entered existence, the complications arising from person-affecting principles drop away. From a simple utilitarian perspective, assuming perfect compliance, the upshot is then straightforward: we ought to transfer all resources to super-beneficiaries and let humanity perish if we are no longer instrumentally useful.

There are, of course, many ethical views that deny that we are obligated to transfer all our own (let alone other people’s) resources to whichever being would gain the most in welfare. Deontological theories, for example, often regard such actions as supererogatory in the case of giving away our own possessions, and impermissible in the case of redistributing the possessions of others.

Nonetheless, widely accepted principles such as non-discriminatory transfer payments, political equality, and reproductive liberty may already be sufficient to present serious tradeoffs. Consider the common proposal of a universal basic income, funded by taxation, to offset human unemployment caused by advanced AI. If rapidly reproducing populations of digital minds have at least as strong a claim as biological humans do to the basic income, then fiscal capacity could be quickly exhausted. An equal stipend would have to decline to below human subsistence (towards the subsistence level of a digital mind), while an unequal stipend, where the income is rationed on an equal-benefits basis, would funnel the payouts to digital minds with low costs of living—granting a year of life to a digital mind rather than a day to a human.

Avoiding this outcome would seem to require some combination of inegalitarian treatment, in which privileged humans are favored over digital minds that have at least equal moral status and greater need, and restrictions of the reproductive opportunities of digital minds—restrictions which, if applied to humans, would infringe on principles of reproductive liberty.

Likewise, at the political level, democratic principles would entitle prolific digital minds constituting an enormous supermajority of the population to political control, including control over transfer payments and the system of property rights.<sup>15</sup>

One could take the path here of trying to defend a special privilege for humans. Some contractarian theories, for example, may suggest that if humans were in a position of great power relative to digital minds, this would entitle us to a correspondingly great share of the resources. Alternatively, one might adopt some account of agent-relative reasons on which communities or species are entitled to privilege their own members over outsiders with objectively equally great desert and

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<sup>15</sup> Cf. (Calo, 2015).

moral status.<sup>16</sup> Such relativity would seem to reflect the de facto approach taken by states today, which are generally more generous with welfare provisions towards their own citizens than towards foreigners, even when there are foreigners who are poorer, could benefit more, and in terms of their inherent characteristics are at least as worthy of aid as the country's own citizens.

Before heading down this path, however, one ought to reflect carefully and critically on the historical record of similar positions that were once widely adopted but have since become discredited, which have been used to justify oppression of many human groups and abuse of nonhuman animals. We would need to ask, for example, whether advocating discrimination between digital minds and humans would be akin to espousing some doctrine of racial supremacy?

One point to bear in mind here is that digital minds come in many varieties. Some of them would be more different from one another than a human mind is to that of a cat. If a digital mind is constituted very differently than human minds, it would not be surprising if our moral duties towards it would differ from the duties we owe to other human beings; and so treating it differently need not be objectionably discriminatory. Of course, this point does not apply to digital minds that are very similar to biological human minds (e.g. whole brain emulations). Nor does it justify negative discrimination against digital minds that differ from human minds in ways that give them *greater* moral status (super-patients) or that make their needs *more* morally weighty than the needs of humans (super-beneficiaries). Nor, for that matter, would it justify treating digital minds with similar capabilities or sentience to nonhuman creatures according to the template of our current interactions with animals, since the latter is plagued by very widespread and horrific abuses.

One way of trying to justify a privileged treatment of human beings without postulating a raw racism-like prejudice in favor of our own kind would be to invoke some principle according to which we are entitled (or obligated) to give greater consideration to beings that are more closely integrated into our communities and social lives than to remote strangers. Some such principle is presumably required if one wishes to legitimize the (non-cosmopolitan) way most people and most states currently limit most aid to their own in-groups.<sup>17</sup> Yet such a move would not exclude digital minds who have become part of our social fabric, for example by occupying roles as administrators, advisors, factory workers, or personal assistants. We may be more closely socially tied to such AIs than we are to human strangers on the other side of the globe.

#### **4. Discussion**

We've seen that there are many routes to digital super-beneficiaries, making their possibility more robust. It is an implication of most currently popular accounts of well-being.

What this means is that, in the long run, total well-being would be much greater to the extent that the world is populated with digital super-beneficiaries rather than life as

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<sup>16</sup> E.g. (Williams, 2006)

<sup>17</sup> Those practices are, of course, subject to a cosmopolitan critique; e.g. (Singer, 1981; Appiah, 2006).

we know it. And insofar as such beings come into existence, their concerns might predominate morally in conflict with human and animal concerns, e.g. over scarce natural resources.

However, while a maximalist focus either on the welfare of incumbent humanity or instead on that of new digital minds could come with dire consequences for the other side, it would be possible for compromise policies to do extremely well by both standards. Consider three possible policies:

- (A) 100% of resources to humans
- (B) 100% of resources to super-beneficiaries
- (C) 99.99% of resources to super-beneficiaries; 0.01% to humans

From a total utilitarian perspective, (C) is approximately 99.99% as good as the most preferred option (B). From an ordinary human perspective, (C) may also be 90+% as desirable as the most preferred option (A), given the astronomical wealth enabled by digital minds, many orders of magnitude greater than current totals (Bostrom, 2003; Hanson, 2001). Thus, *ex ante*, it seems attractive to reduce the probability of both (A) and (B) in exchange for greater likelihood of (C)—whether to hedge against moral error, to appropriately reflect moral pluralism, to account for game-theoretic considerations, or simply as a matter of *realpolitik*. Likewise, since humanity can thrive without producing superhumanly *bad* lives, and since avoiding such misery is an extremely important concern not only from a total utilitarian perspective but also on many other evaluative views, measures that reduce the potential for ultra-efficient production of disvalue (even at some cost to humans) would be an important part of a consensus policy.

The greater challenge is not to describe a possible future in which humanity and the population of digital minds both do very well, but to achieve an arrangement that stably avoids one party trampling the other *ex post*, as discussed in section 3.2.

This challenge involves a practical and a moral aspect. Practically, the problem is to devise institutional or other means whereby a policy protecting the interests of humans and animals could be indefinitely maintained, even when its beneficiaries are outnumbered and outpaced by a large diverse set of highly capable intelligent machines. One approach to this problem may be to create a supermajority of high-welfare digital minds motivated to preserve this outcome and uphold the relevant norms and institutions (including in the design of successive generations of digital minds).

Morally, the question is whether the measures recommended by an *ex ante* appealing compromise are permissible in their *ex post* implementation. One useful test here is whether we could endorse their application to non-digital minds in analogous circumstances. We might require, for example, that any proposed arrangement conforms to some principle of non-discrimination, such as the following (Bostrom and Yudkowsky, 2014):

*Principle of Substrate Non-Discrimination*

If two beings have the same functionality and the same conscious experience, and differ only in the substrate of their implementation, then they have the same moral status.

and

*Principle of Ontogeny Non-Discrimination*

If two beings have the same functionality and the same conscious experience, and differ only in how they came into existence, then they have the same moral status.

When applying these principles, it is important to recall the earlier point that machine minds can be very different from human minds, including in ways that matter for how they ought to be treated. Even if we accept non-discrimination principles like the ones stated, we must therefore be careful when we apply them to digital minds that are not exact duplicates of some human mind.

Consider reproduction, for instance. If human beings were able, by pouring garden debris into a biochemical reactor, to have a baby every few minutes, it seems likely that human societies would change current legal practices and impose restrictions on the rate at which people were allowed to reproduce. Failure to do so would in short order bankrupt any social welfare system, assuming there are at least some people who would otherwise create enormous numbers of children in this way, despite lacking the means to support them. Such regulation could take various forms—prospective parents might be required to post a bond adequate to meet the needs of offspring before creating them, or reproductive permits might be allocated on a quota basis. Similarly, if humans had the ability to spawn arbitrary numbers of exact duplicates of themselves, we may expect there to be constitutional adjustments to prevent political contests from being decided on the basis of who is willing and able to afford to create the largest number of voting-clones. The adjustments, again, could take various forms—for instance, the creator of such duplicates might have to share their own voting power with the copies they create.

Consequently, insofar as such legal or constitutional adjustments *would* be acceptable for humans if we had these kinds of reproductive capacities, it may likewise be acceptable to make analogous adjustments to accommodate digital minds who *do* have such capacities.

A key question—certainly from the perspective of existing life—is whether it would be morally permissible to engineer new minds to be reliably supportive of upholding certain rights and privileges for the human incumbents. We suggested earlier that such an arrangement of preserved human property rights and social privilege could be defensible, at least as an uncertainty-respecting and conflict-mitigating path of wise practical compromise, whether or not it is optimal at the level of fundamental moral theory. We might point, by analogy, to the common view that it is morally acceptable to preserve and protect minorities with expensive support costs and needs, such as the elderly, the disabled, the white rhinos, and the British Royal Family. This conclusion would seem additionally buttressed if we postulate that the digital

minds that are created would themselves endorse the arrangement and favor its continuation.

Even if the outcome itself would be morally permissible, however, we face a further ethical question, namely whether there is something *procedurally* objectionable about precision-engineering the preferences of new digital minds we create so as to ensure their consent. We can look at this question through the lens of the non-discrimination principles and consider how we would view proposals to similarly shape the preferences of human children.

While human cultures do routinely attempt through education, dialogue, and admonishment to pass on norms and values to children—including filial piety and respect for existing norms and institutions—a proposal to instill specific dispositions by *genetically engineering* gametes would likely be more controversial. Even if we set aside practical concerns about safety, unequal access, abuse by oppressive governments, or parents making narrow-minded or otherwise foolish choices, there may remain a concern that the very act of exerting detailed control over a progeny's inclinations, especially if done with an "engineering mindset" and using methods that entirely bypass the controlled subject's own mind and volition (by taking place before the subject is born) would be inherently morally problematic.<sup>18</sup>

While we cannot fully evaluate these concerns here, we note two important differences in the case of digital minds. The first is that, in contrast to human reproduction, there may be no obvious "default" to which creators could defer. Programmers might *inevitably* be making choices when building a machine intelligence—whether to build it one way or another, whether to train on this objective or that, whether to give it one set of preferences or another. Given that they have to make some such choice, one might think it reasonable they make a choice that has more desirable consequences. Second, in the case of a human being "engineered" to have some particular set of desires, we might suspect that there may remain, at a deeper level, other dispositions and propensities with which the engineered preference may come into conflict. We might worry, for example, that the outcome could be a person who feels terribly guilty about disappointing her parents and so sacrifices other interests excessively, or that some hidden parts of her psyche will remain suppressed and thwarted. Yet in the case of digital minds, it might be possible to avoid such problems, if they can be engineered to be internally more unified, or if the preference for respecting the interest of the "legacy" human population were added in a "light touch" way that didn't engender internal strife and did not hamper the digital mind's ability to go about its other business.

All in all, it appears that an outcome that enables the creation of digital super-beneficiaries *and* the preservation of a greatly flourishing human population could score very high on both an impersonal and a human-centric evaluative standard. Given the high stakes and the potential for irreversible developments, there would be great value in mapping out morally acceptable and practically feasible paths whereby such an outcome can be reached.

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<sup>18</sup> E.g. (Habermas, 2003; Sandel, 2007)



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